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People negotiate agreements "in the shadow of the law," whether in the private 
ordering of affairs such as drafting contracts or in the public forum of settling lawsuits.[1]  
A reverse phenomenon, however, has gone largely unnoticed: judges occasionally declare 
law in the shadow of negotiated settlements.  In interpreting the terms of a consent 
decree[2] when the parties themselves cannot agree on what obligations such terms 
impose, the judge may determine that both the words and the parties' own intentions are 
so ambiguous that the words must be interpreted in light of the substantive law that gave 
rise to the plaintiffs' claim.  This writer has previously contended that the meaning of an 
ambiguous term should be determined, in part, "by reference to the constitutional or 
statutory rights sought to be vindicated in the litigation."  Even if the law is somewhat 
uncertain, part of the judge's interpretive effort should be to determine which 
interpretation "will best serve the policies of the relevant law."[3]  It appears that the 
federal courts, at least, have adopted this position.[4] 
 
A recent decision by a divided federal appeals court, however, reached an 
alarming result that requires reconsideration of this position.  In Microsoft v. United 
States, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("Microsoft I"), the parties settled an antitrust 
lawsuit by entering into a consent decree in 1995.  One provision in the decree prohibited 
Microsoft from requiring computer manufacturers to license an "other product" as a 
condition of licensing its Windows 95[5] operating system, but also permitted Microsoft 
to develop "integrated products."  When Microsoft sought to require manufacturers to 
license its Internet Explorer[6] browser as a condition of licensing Windows 95, the 
government contended that Microsoft had violated the decree because the browser was an 
"other product."  A panel majority of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
(hereinafter D.C. Circuit), however, held that Microsoft's Internet Explorer browser is an 
integral part of the Windows 95 operating system rather than an "other product," and, 
therefore, Microsoft did not violate the consent decree.[7]  The majority determined that 
the prohibition against mandatory licensing of an "other product" was intended to 
prohibit Microsoft from engaging in anticompetitive "tying" of one product to a distinct 
product.[8]  Relying on a test proposed in a leading antitrust law treatise, the Microsoft I 
majority concluded that mandatory inclusion of Microsoft's browser with its Windows 95 
operating system was not an illegal tying arrangement.[9]  
   Less than a week after the Microsoft I decision, however, the author of the tying 
test relied upon by the majority objected publicly that the majority had misinterpreted the 
test and thereby reached the wrong result.[10]  Other critics have charged that the 
Microsoft I decision "appears to be nothing less than a direct assault on" the leading 
precedents of the U.S. Supreme Court[11] and that the panel majority "wholly ignored 
the competitive consequences that Microsoft's practices had on the market for browser 
software" and "abdicated its responsibility to protect consumers against anticompetitive 
ties."[12] Even commentators who have accused the government of attempting to use 
consent decrees as a form of disguised regulation lamented that this interpretive effort 
was "not a process designed for the intelligent formulation of antitrust policy." [13]  
 
The D.C. Circuit's embarrassing mistake in interpreting a consent decree in a way 
that conflicts with the underlying substantive law has the flavor of an ill-considered rush 
to judgment.  The Microsoft I case has been largely superseded by a second, broader 
antitrust lawsuit against Microsoft by the United States and numerous states ("Microsoft 
II") which, as of this writing, is still in trial.[14]  It has been noted that Microsoft II "may 
determine the antitrust standard for monopolization for the next generation,"[15] but 
others have predicted that the Microsoft I decision "may also have sounded the death 
knell for the [government's] ability to prevail on the tying claims in its most recent 
complaint."[16] Thus, the Microsoft I decision raises a troubling question about the 
interpretation of consent decrees: should judges decide questions of substantive law in 
interpreting ambiguous words in consent decrees when the issue of law may not be 
properly before the Court, when the relevant law is unclear, or when the court disagrees 
with established law?  
 
Resolution of this question is important in two respects.  First, it will define the 
proper role of the federal judiciary in making substantive law through interpretation of 
consent decrees rather than through the normal trial and appeal process of adjudication.  
Second, it will affect the use of consent decrees as a form of dispute resolution, because 
to the extent the federal judiciary claims the authority to declare substantive law through 
interpretation of settlement terms, litigants may conclude that it is undesirable to have 
lawmaking occur in this manner.  They may well opt for traditional adversary litigation, 
thus undermining the policies favoring settlement of cases.  
 
This article explores the history of federal judicial interpretation of consent 
decrees and advocates a restrained approach to interpreting ambiguous settlement terms 
in light of the underlying substantive law.  The proposed approach does not eliminate 
such a method of interpretation, but avoids the misguided effort of the D.C. Circuit in 
Microsoft I.  Part I reviews the standards for interpretation of consent decrees that have 
emerged in the federal courts over the past three decades and sets forth a model of 
interpretation that is consistent with the emergent caselaw.  Part II examines the problem 
of interpretation that arose in Microsoft I and analyzes the difficulties posed by the D.C. 
Circuit's declaration of substantive antitrust law in that case.  Part III discusses the policy 
considerations that should be weighed in determining the extent to which judges should 
declare law "in the shadow of" negotiation.  The Conclusion argues that it is appropriate 
for courts to interpret ambiguous terms in consent decrees in light of underlying 
substantive law if other extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent surrounding the 
negotiation of the terms does not clearly resolve the issue.  If the issue of law is not 
properly before the court, however, or if the law is not reasonably clear, courts should not 
decide what the law is, but instead should interpret ambiguous terms based solely on 
other extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent.  Furthermore, if the law is clear, the court 
should follow it rather than decide what it thinks the law should be. 
 
  I. THE STANDARDS FOR INTERPRETATION OF CONSENT DECREES 
     A. The Basic Model: From the "Four Corners" Rule to "Aids to Construction" 
 
The Supreme Court of the United States set the basic parameters of consent 
decree interpretation in a trilogy of cases decided in the past quarter century.  The first of 
these cases, United States v. Armour, involved the Meatpackers Antitrust Consent Decree 
of 1920, which prohibited meatpacking companies from engaging in the retail food 
business.[17]  When a company engaged in the retail food business acquired a controlling 
interest in one of the defendant meatpackers, the government sought a court order that the 
food retailer divest ownership of the meatpacker.  The consent decree did not expressly 
prohibit acquisition of a meatpacker by a company engaged in food retailing.  The 
government contended, however, that the acquiring company was engaged in business 
activities that the decree prohibited the meatpacker from engaging in, and that the 
acquisition would cause the meatpacker to become engaged in the prohibited activities in 
violation of the decree's purpose to effect a complete separation of meatpacking from 
food retailing.[18]  In its decision, the Court emphasized that the decree did not by its 
terms mandate a complete separation, but only prohibited certain activities which did not 
include acquisition of a meatpacker by a food retailer.[19]   
 
Rejecting the argument that such an acquisition should be divested because it 
would frustrate the overall purpose of the decree, the Court set forth what has come to be 
known as the "four corners rule": Consent decrees are entered into by parties to a case 
after careful negotiation has produced agreement on their precise terms.  The parties 
waive their right to litigate the issues involved in the case and thus save themselves the 
time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation; . . . in exchange for the saving of cost and 
elimination of risk, the parties each give up something they might have won had they 
proceeded with the litigation.  Thus, the decree itself cannot be said to have a purpose; 
rather the parties have purposes, generally opposed to each other, and the resultant decree 
embodies as much of those opposing purposes as the respective parties have the 
bargaining power and skill to achieve.  For these reasons, the scope of a consent decree 
must be discerned within its four corners, and not by reference to what might satisfy the 
purposes of one of the parties to it.  Because the defendant has, by the decree, waived his 
right to litigate the issues raised, a right guaranteed to him by the Due Process Clause, the 
conditions upon which he has given that waiver must be respected, and the instrument 
must be construed as it is written, and not as it might have been written had the plaintiff 
established his factual claims and legal theories in litigation.[20]  
   
The most obvious reading of Armour is that it sets forth a rule of strict 
construction: if a consent decree specifically prohibits certain activities, it cannot be 
construed to impose additional prohibitions not mentioned in the decree.  The Court's 
rationale for this rule is that a consent decree is a contract in which the parties have 
waived their right to fully litigate the issues in exchange for the agreed-upon terms, so 
that imposing additional terms would be unfair.  
   
First, consent decrees by their nature provide for prospective relief into the future 
in which unexpected events often threaten the reforms intended by the decree.  If courts 
cannot take cognizance of unexpected events in interpreting consent decrees, then much 
of the incentive to settle cases is lost because the parties know that the decree will prove 
ineffective when such events occur.  Second, the Court's premise that a consent decree is 
a contract supports a mode of interpretation that takes account of circumstances 
surrounding the decree in order to determine the mutual intent of the parties, rather than 
focusing exclusively on the precise words of the contract.[21]  
   
An even broader reading of Armour is that it stands for the proposition that if a 
consent decree does not expressly address a particular issue, it cannot be interpreted in a 
way that permits the court to address the issue.  The Court soon disavowed any such 
proposition, however, in United States v. I.T.T. Continental Baking Co.[22]  In I.T.T. the 
defendant violated a consent decree which expressly provided that a penalty should be 
imposed for such violations, but was silent on what should be the precise nature of the 
penalty.[23]  Because the parties had not agreed on a precise penalty, the "four corners" 
rule of Armour could have been applied to strip the judge of the authority to impose any 
penalty.   
 
The Court, however, made clear that Armour did not support such a conclusion: 
Since a consent decree or order is to be construed for enforcement purposes basically as a 
contract, reliance upon certain aids to construction is proper, as with any other contract.  
Such aids include the circumstances surrounding the formation of the consent order, any 
technical meaning words used may have had to the parties, and any other documents 
expressly incorporated in the decree.  Such reliance does not in any way depart from the 
"four corners" rule of Armour.[24]  
   
Applying this rule of construction, the I.T.T. court found that federal antitrust law 
provided the underlying substantive law for the original complaint and that the term 
"penalty" had a specialized meaning in antitrust law.  Thus, concluded the Court, federal 
antitrust law defined the manner in which a penalty should be assessed.[25] 
   
At first glance, it might appear that I.T.T. overruled Armour by establishing a 
method of interpretation that is not limited to the express terms of the consent decree, but 
instead permits and may require those terms to be given a meaning consistent with 
extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent.  This view is bolstered by the fact that the I.T.T. 
consent decree did not say penalties were to be assessed in the manner provided for by 
federal antitrust law.  On the other hand, the Court stated that reliance upon "aids to 
construction" to interpret a consent decree is not inconsistent with Armour.  A close 
comparison of the two cases reveals what the Court meant.  In Armour, the consent 
decree prohibited various activities but it did not prohibit the activity at issue.   
In other words, the decree was unambiguous in that it did not prohibit a food 
retailer from acquiring a meatpacker.  In I.T.T., on the other hand, the consent decree 
expressly provided that a penalty would be imposed for a violation of the decree, but did 
not define precisely what penalty the court should impose.  Thus, in I.T.T., and unlike 
Armour, the decree was ambiguous because the disputed term was capable of two 
plausible interpretations; specifically, the term "penalty" could have been interpreted to 
mean a single monetary fine for the violation, or a monetary fine for each day the 
violation had occurred.[26]  
   
This comparison of the Armour and I.T.T. decisions reveals how the method of 
interpretation formulated in I.T.T. is consistent with the "four corners" rule of Armour.  If 
the consent decree is unambiguous with respect to the issue at hand, the court must 
interpret the decree in that manner without resort to extrinsic evidence to determine the 
parties' intent.  If the decree contains terms that are capable of more than one plausible 
interpretation, I.T.T. permits the court to rely upon external aids to construction to 
determine which interpretation is correct.  According to I.T.T., one of the aids to 
interpretation that may be employed in determining the meaning of ambiguous terms is 
the substantive law that gave rise to the litigation if the disputed terms have a specialized 
meaning in the substantive law, such as "penalty" in antitrust law.  This particular aspect 
of the I.T.T. decision has provided the opportunity for courts to declare substantive law in 
cases that have not been fully litigated, but instead ended in a consent decree.[27]  
 
The Court revisited the question of interpretation in the third of this trilogy of 
cases, Firefighters v. Stotts.[28]  In Stotts, the consent decree expressly provided for 
goals to increase minority representation within each job rank and contained an express 
statement that its purpose was to remedy past discrimination in hiring and promotion.  
The decree did not provide for racial preferences in the event of layoffs.  After this decree 
resulted in minority gains in hiring and promotion, the defendant proposed to lay off 
workers due to a financial crisis, and to do so according to the terms of a collective 
bargaining agreement which required layoffs according to seniority.  Layoffs conducted 
in this manner would have reduced minority representation because minority workers 
recently hired pursuant to the consent decree had less seniority than older white 
workers.[29]  The Court held, however, that the express terms of the consent decree 
could not be interpreted to prohibit seniority-based layoffs.  Relying heavily on the "four 
corners" rule of Armour, the court found that "there is no mention of layoffs or demotions 
within the four corners of the decree; nor is there any suggestion of an intention to depart 
from the existing seniority system or from the City's arrangements with the Union."[30]   
 
The Court found that the decree's express purpose was limited to remedying racial 
discrimination in hiring and promotion and "did not include the displacement of white 
employees with seniority over blacks."[31] Conspicuously absent from the Court's 
Opinion is any reference to the "aids to construction" analysis of I.T.T.  
 
One analysis of the Armour - I.T.T. - Stotts trilogy is first, that Armour adopted a 
rule of strict construction of consent decrees under which courts should never impose 
obligations not expressly agreed to, that I.T.T. was a departure from this rule, and third 
that Stotts reestablished Armour's rule of strict construction.  In this view, the trilogy of 
cases left massive confusion in its wake because the Court was unclear whether use of 
aids to construction is appropriate in all disputes over interpretation, or only when the 
express terms are ambiguous.[32]  If use of extrinsic evidence is proper only when the 
terms of the decree are ambiguous, then this trilogy raises a second issue: under what 
circumstances is it appropriate for courts to expound upon the underlying substantive law 
as one such aid?  A closely related question arises in cases in which the parties' own 
intent differs from the substantive law with respect to the parties' obligations, should the 
parties' intent or the law prevail in interpretation of consent decrees?  Some guidance for 
answering these questions is provided by an examination of cases decided subsequent to 
the Armour - I.T.T. - Stotts trilogy.    
   
      B. The Post-Trilogy Era 
          1. The "Four Corners" Rule 
 
It has been observed that an "unsettled" issue is whether it is proper to resort to 
aids to construction in interpreting a consent decree when the terms of the decree are 
unambiguous.[33]   One proponent of this view contends that some courts have resorted 
to extrinsic evidence only if the express terms are ambiguous, while others use extrinsic 
evidence without making a finding that the terms are ambiguous.[34]  By now, however, 
this issue has been settled.  All but two of the circuit courts of appeals have held that if 
the terms of a consent decree are unambiguous, it is improper to use extrinsic evidence to 
extract an interpretation at odds with those terms.[35] Thus, it is no longer accurate to 
conclude that the Armour - I.T.T. - Stotts trilogy has sown massive confusion.  The courts 
of appeals have not concluded that I.T.T. overruled Armour or that Stotts overruled I.T.T., 
but rather have understood those cases as establishing a rule that use of aids to 
construction is proper if, and only if, the agreed terms are ambiguous.[36]  
   
This rule is consistent with both the nature of consent decrees and the policies 
such decrees are designed to promote.  Although a consent decree is a legal hybrid -- a 
contract between the parties and an order of the court -- when questions of interpretation 
arise it is to be treated as a contract.[37]  The intent of the parties is expressed in the 
words they chose to embody in their contract.  If the words they chose are capable of only 
one plausible interpretation, the use of extrinsic evidence to divine a different 
interpretation carries grave dangers of imposing obligations never agreed upon and of 
avoiding the responsibility to perform functions that were agreed upon.  Moreover, the 
overriding value of consent decrees is that they avoid the costs of full-scale litigation 
while permitting the parties to craft a resolution of their dispute that is likely to be a more 
practical solution to their problem than an order imposed by a judge who is less familiar 
with the dispute than the parties themselves.[38]  A major incentive to enter into such an 
agreement is the parties' confidence that the court will measure their obligations by the 
words they choose, and if the words are clear, so are their obligations.  If the court is free 
to change those obligations no matter how clearly set forth in the agreement, this 
incentive to settle will be reduced and much of the value of consent decrees will be 
lost.[39]  The parties' agreement would be more like a roll of the dice than a document 
with predictable outcomes, so they would be more likely to spurn a risky settlement and 
take their chances at trial.  Giving unambiguous terms their plain meaning without resort 
to extrinsic evidence will promote settlement and ensure fairness to the parties.[40]  
          
This understanding of the Armour - I.T.T. - Stotts trilogy refutes the notion that 
Armour and Stotts established a strict rule that consent decrees cannot be interpreted to 
impose requirements that are not expressly spelled out in the decree.  That is not the "four 
corners" rule.  There is an important distinction between increasing a party's 
responsibilities to include additional obligations not agreed to, which Armour and Stotts 
prohibit, and construing a decree to include requirements designed to ensure compliance 
with terms the parties agreed to, which I.T.T. permits.  This distinction is illustrated by 
two lines of cases, one holding that a consent decree cannot be interpreted to impose 
additional obligations the parties did not agree to, and the other holding that terms the 
parties agreed to implicitly include requirements designed to assure compliance with the 
agreed terms.  
   
The latter line of cases is exemplified by a series of decisions resolving numerous 
disputes over interpretation of a consent decree between the United States government 
and the Teamsters Union.  In 1988, the United States sued the Teamsters Union claiming 
that the Mafia controlled the Union through extortion and other illegal acts in violation of 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.[41]  The government sought 
relief that would reform the Union's election process, prohibit Mafia and Union officers 
from associating with each other, and generally rid the Union of Mafia influence.  On the 
eve of trial in 1989, the parties agreed to settle the case with a consent decree providing 
reform in two primary areas of union operation: elections and discipline of corrupt 
members.  With respect to elections, the decree required appointment of an independent 
Elections Officer with the authority to supervise the first-ever direct rank-and-file vote to 
elect Teamsters Union officers.  With respect to disciplining corrupt Union members, the 
decree provided for the appointment of an Investigations Officer to investigate and 
prosecute charges of corruption, and of an Administrator to hear and decide charges of 
corruption.  
   
Unfortunately, numerous disputes erupted over implementation of the decree, 
which the government viewed as Mafia attempts to retain control of the Union despite the 
settlement.  The Elections Officer was appointed and she promptly promulgated rules to 
govern rank-and-file election of delegates to the Union convention, conduct of the 
nominations process at the Union Convention, and rank-and-file election of Union 
officers.  The Union objected on the ground that the Election Officer had no authority to 
issue rules to govern the election process because the decree did not expressly authorize 
such rules.  It is clear that the rules imposed obligations on the Union that were not 
provided in the decree itself,[42] so that if Armour and Stotts established a flat rule that 
consent decrees cannot be interpreted to impose obligations the parties have not expressly 
agreed upon, these rules would have been invalid.  
   
The court, however, upheld the elections rules on the ground that the decree 
expressly authorized the Elections Officer to "supervise" union elections and to 
"distribute materials about the election."[43] The court reasoned that the power to 
"supervise" conferred "broad supervisory authority" on the Elections Officer to ensure a 
fair rank-and-file election, which should include "any reasonable effort to inform the 
[Union] membership of matters relating to the election."[44]  This decision in the 
Teamsters litigation thus stands for the proposition that express terms of a consent decree 
may be interpreted to encompass reasonable efforts to ensure compliance with such 
terms, even though such efforts are not spelled out in the decree.  The decision did not 
impose obligations upon the Union that it had not agreed to, for it agreed to allow the 
Elections Officer to "supervise" its elections.  As such it is not inconsistent with a proper 
understanding of Armour and Stotts, but instead falls within the rationale of I.T.T. that a 
decree may be construed to include requirements designed to achieve compliance with 
terms the parties agreed to.[45]  
   
Pursuant to the authority granted by the consent decree, the Investigations Officer 
charged two Union officials with bringing "reproach upon the Union" in violation of the 
Union Constitution.  These charges were based upon the officials' criminal conviction of 
racketeering and embezzlement, for which the Investigations Officer sought their 
removal from office.  The Union's governing board attempted to defeat the effort to 
remove the two officials from office by passing a resolution interpreting the term 
"reproach upon the Union" in a restrictive manner that excluded the charges against these 
two officials.  Based upon this resolution, the two officials challenged the Administrator's 
authority to hear the charges.  The Administrator ruled that he was not bound by the 
resolution, sustained the charges, and suspended the officials for one year.[46]  
   
The court held that the Administrator had the authority to disregard the 
exculpatory resolution.[47]  The Union Constitution gave its governing board the 
authority to issue definitive interpretations of its disciplinary rules and the consent decree 
did not expressly authorize the Administrator to override such interpretation.  The 
consent decree, however, expressly vested the Administrator with "the same rights and 
powers" as the governing board to discharge duties related to disciplining corrupt officers 
and also with the authority to "review" decisions by the board on disciplinary charges.  
The court reasoned that the Administrator's power to review disciplinary decisions by the 
board "necessarily includes the final authority to determine what constitutes an offense 
subject to discipline under the [Union] Constitution."[48]  Like the interpretation of the 
electoral provisions, this interpretation of the disciplinary provisions of the consent 
decree imposed a requirement that was not stated precisely in the decree, but that was 
essential to ensure compliance with the decree's express terms.  As such, it falls within 
the rationale of I.T.T. and is not a departure from the "four corners" rule.[49]  
   
The other line of cases, adhering to the Armour - Stotts rule that a consent decree 
cannot be interpreted to impose additional obligations the parties did not agree to, is 
exemplified by several decisions interpreting a consent decree between the United States 
government and American Telephone and Telegraph Co. ("AT&T").  The government 
sued AT&T claiming that AT&T's monopoly over both long distance and local telephone 
service violated federal antitrust law.  The settlement required AT&T to divest its twenty-
two Bell Operating Companies ("BOCs") and to create seven Regional Holding 
Companies ("RHCs") to own and operate the BOCs.  Each RHC was thereby limited to 
providing local telephone service in its BOC's region.  The consent decree also prohibited 
the BOCs from entering various lines of business so that they could not use their 
monopoly over local service to impede competition in the prohibited lines of business.  
The decree further provided that the court could waive a particular restriction if a BOC 
could show that permitting it to engage in the prohibited activity would not impede 
competition.[50]  Like the Teamsters consent decree, these restrictions spawned 
numerous disputes over what activities the BOCs were prohibited from engaging in 
without first obtaining a waiver.  
 
One restriction prohibited the BOCs from providing "interexchange 
telecommunications services."  Several RHCs proposed to provide two-way mobile 
phone and one-way paging services outside their assigned regions and sought 
clarification of whether they were prohibited from doing so.[51]  The court held that the 
consent decree did not prohibit the RHCs from providing exchange services outside their 
assigned regions, including mobile phone and one-way paging services.[52]   The court 
reasoned that the decree did not explicitly prohibit RHCs from providing services outside 
their regions, nor was there any evidence that the parties had "reached any agreement on 
the issue of extraregional exchange services."[53] The fact that the decree assigned 
certain localities to each BOC so that each RHC was assigned a region in which its BOCs 
operated "was merely a function of the need, at the time of divestiture, to divide the Bell 
System's local operations into coherent units in which the BOC could function without 
entering the interexchange, or long distance, business."  The regional designation was not 
intended to impose geographic restrictions on all future BOC activities.[54]  The decree's 
silence on this issue had, in the court's view, a simple explanation: "the parties and the 
district court never considered the possibility that the BOCs might want to provide 
exchange services outside of their geographic regions."[55]    
   
This AT&T case is similar to Stotts in that both cases involved new circumstances 
subsequent to the consent decree - layoffs in Stotts and new technology in AT&T.  The 
parties had not contemplated the effects of these new circumstances and, therefore, had 
not reached agreement concerning their impact on the decree. In such circumstances, the 
decree cannot be interpreted to impose additional obligations or prohibitions.  
   
A second interpretation dispute arose from a provision in the AT&T consent 
decree that the BOCs were prohibited from engaging in certain lines of business either 
"directly or through any affiliated enterprise" without a waiver.  One of the BOCs 
proposed to acquire an option to purchase a company engaged in developing a 
transatlantic cable system.  Thus, the question arose whether acquisition of a conditional 
interest in a company creates an "affiliated enterprise" requiring court approval.[56]  The 
court held that the decree could not be interpreted as imposing an obligation on the BOCs 
to seek a waiver before acquiring a conditional interest in a company that allegedly is 
engaged in a line of business prohibited to the BOCs.[57]  The court reasoned that the 
decree did not expressly require BOCs to seek such a waiver merely to acquire a 
conditional interest.  Moreover, imposition of such an obligation would mean that a BOC 
who acquired a conditional interest in another company would be in violation of the 
decree even if the company were determined not to be engaged in activities prohibited to 
the BOCs.  Such an interpretation "necessarily goes beyond the scope of the bargain 
embodied in the decree."[58]  Like the previous AT&T decision, this decision stands for 
the proposition that a consent decree cannot be interpreted to impose additional 
obligations upon which the parties reached no agreement, for in this AT&T case the 
parties did not agree that the BOCs must obtain a waiver in order to acquire a conditional 
interest in another company.  The decree provided only that, if a BOC did acquire such an 
interest, it must seek a waiver in order for the acquired company to engage in the 
restricted lines of business.  
   
It is thus implicit in the "four corners" rule of Armour and Stotts that courts may 
not interpret consent decrees in a way that imposes additional obligations with respect to 
issues on which the parties reached no agreement.  The "four corners" rule, however, 
does not mean that if a particular obligation is not spelled out with precision in the decree 
a court can never interpret the decree to encompass such an obligation.  A court clearly 
has the authority to do so if imposing such an obligation is a reasonable means of 
assuring compliance with terms the parties have agreed upon.[59]  
 
This distinction between additional obligations and obligations implicit in the 
need to implement the decree is consistent with the legitimate values served by consent 
decrees.  Such decrees typically entail structural, long-term reform of large, complex 
entities such as corporations, unions, prisons and school districts.  It is simply impossible 
to spell out in precise detail every single requirement that must be met over a period of 
years in such a case, so that the parties often agree on general terms such as "supervise" 
and "review,"[60] leaving the elaboration of precise requirements to future contingencies 
as they arise.  If nothing at all could be implied from general terms then it would be easy, 
as demonstrated by the Teamsters cases,[61] for a recalcitrant defendant to evade 
compliance with the general terms through new schemes the decree did not address.  
Moreover, the incentive to settle such cases would be greatly diminished, for general 
terms would be unenforceable because they could have no specific application.  On the 
other hand, allowing courts to impose new obligations with respect to issues on which the 
parties reached no agreement, solely to advance the perceived purpose of the decree, 
smacks of unfair surprise to the defendant and reduces the incentive to settle.  Parties 
settle cases in the belief that the agreed terms both create and limit the scope of their 
obligations.  Thus a consent decree, while providing for reform, should not become a 
power unto itself, constantly expanding into new areas that the parties never 
contemplated.  If consent decrees could do so through a rule of interpretation that 
permitted imposition of new obligations, defendants would be much more likely to 
forego settlement in favor of adjudication, where the limits of authoritatively declared 
law would restrain the court's ability to expand its remedial authority.  
   
           2. Ambiguous terms and "Aids to Construction" 
 
The "four corners" rule of Armour and Stotts does not apply if the parties to a 
consent decree are in dispute over the meaning of terms used in the decree and the terms 
are indeed ambiguous.  In such a case, I.T.T. makes clear that the court may utilize "aids 
to construction" to determine the parties' intent concerning the terms.[62]  In I.T.T., the 
Court listed several such aids: "the circumstances surrounding the formulation of the 
consent order, any technical meaning words used may have had to the parties, and any 
other documents expressly incorporated in the decree."[63]  
   
The "four corners" rule of Armour and Stotts does not apply if the parties to a 
consent decree are in dispute over the meaning of terms used in the decree and the terms 
are indeed ambiguous.  In such a case, I.T.T. makes clear that the court may utilize "aids 
to construction" to determine the parties' intent concerning the terms.[62]  In I.T.T., the 
Court listed several such aids: "the circumstances surrounding the formulation of the 
consent order, any technical meaning words used may have had to the parties, and any 
other documents expressly incorporated in the decree."[63]  
 
The federal courts of appeals have further elaborated upon the constructional aids 
identified by the Supreme Court.  Among the surrounding circumstances that may be 
consulted are the original pleadings,[64] the history of the prior negotiations, the parties' 
own statements concerning the purposes and operation of the settlement during the 
process of obtaining court approval of the decree,[65] and the manner in which the 
parties conduct themselves after the decree has been approved.[66]  Technical meaning 
may be ascribed not only to words that appear on their surface to have specialized 
meaning,[67] but also to ordinary, everyday words which, in the context of settlement, 
appear to have a more particularized meaning that it would have normally.[68]  
Additional documents that may be consulted include both documents that the decree 
expressly includes as part of the agreement approved by the court and those attached to 
the decree which shed light on the parties' intent but were not formally approved by the 
court.[69]  In addition to the factors listed by the I.T.T. Court, courts have also considered 
the manner in which the parties have structured a consent decree, as a means of assuring 
that the disputed terms are given an effect that accords with the overall operation of the 
decree.  Such structural factors include statements of general purpose explicitly 
incorporated in the decree,[70] the manner in which the same word is used elsewhere in 
the decree,[71] and the effect the interpretation will have on the operation of other 
provisions of the decree.[72]  The richness and variety of interpretive materials used by 
the courts demonstrate that interpretation of ambiguous terms is a "practical enterprise" in 
determining the intent of the parties, not a process bound by rigid, technical rules.[73]  
 
Resorting to "aids to construction" has led courts in some cases, including 
Microsoft I, to review the substantive law that gave rise to the lawsuit even though the 
case was settled rather than resolved through adjudication, the normal route by which the 
law is declared.  Herein lies the process of making law in the shadow of negotiation.  
There are three circumstances in which courts have determined that resort to substantive 
law is essential to the process of interpretation.  One such circumstance is where the 
consent decree expressly refers to such law as a source of the parties' obligations.  In such 
a case, an authoritative declaration of law is a means of effectuating the parties' expressed 
intent.[74]  
   
Second, when one party asserts that one of the competing interpretations is in 
conflict with the requirements of the underlying substantive law, the court must review 
such law in order to determine whether a conflict actually exists, for it is well-established 
that the terms of a consent decree cannot be given an interpretation which would, if 
enforced, violate the law.[75]  This does not mean, however, that a consent decree cannot 
be interpreted to require a party to do more than the law requires.  The Supreme Court 
has held that, since the parties' agreement rather than the law the complaint was based 
upon creates the parties' obligations, their obligations are to be measured by the 
agreement and not the law.  A consent decree is not invalid solely because it imposes 
greater obligations than a court would have the authority to impose through 
adjudication.[76]  This rationale implies that a court's task is to determine whether one 
competing interpretation is inconsistent with the law, not whether such interpretation 
would require a party to do more or less than a court could order it to do.  Thus, if the 
evidence shows that the parties intended to undertake obligations greater or lesser than 
required by law, that interpretation takes precedence over legal mandates.[77]  
   
The third area in which review of substantive law is needed follows from the 
I.T.T. Court's inclusion of "technical meaning" of words as one of the proper "aids to 
construction."[78]  If a disputed term in a consent decree carries with it a specialized 
meaning in the area of law that gave rise to the lawsuit, a court must review the law in 
order to determine precisely the term's specialized meaning.[79]  Since it is this 
circumstance -- use of terms with specialized meaning in the relevant area of law -- that 
led the court in Microsoft I into its misadventure in interpretation,[80]  it is important to 
examine the precise way in which courts have employed this particular method of 
interpretation in order to appreciate fully the error that occurred in Microsoft I.  
   
Goluba v. School Dist. of Ripon[81] exemplifies this line of cases. In Goluba, the 
plaintiff claimed that school officials had violated the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment[82] by including prayers as part of graduation ceremonies.  The parties 
agreed to entry of a consent decree that prohibited the school officials from "intentionally 
allowing or permitting" prayer at graduation.  Thereafter, it came to several officials' 
attention that individual students planned, on their own initiative, to recite a prayer at 
graduation and invite other students to join them.  The officials did not stop them from 
doing so.  Plaintiff contended that permitting prayer to occur in this manner violated the 
prohibition against "intentionally" permitting prayer, contending that the word 
"intentionally" encompasses a situation in which school officials have knowledge of a 
student plan to conduct prayer, but fail to stop it.  Defendants offered a competing 
interpretation of "intentionally" that, in the context of the consent decree, was limited to 
situations in which school officials purposefully promote or sponsor student-initiated 
prayer.[83] 
  
The court found that the word "intentionally" was ambiguous so that the word 
should be given an interpretation that accorded with the mutual intent of the parties, 
which required "understanding the context in which the decree was entered."[84]  The 
most significant part of the "context" of this case was the decision in Lee v. Weisman, in 
which the Supreme Court held that the Establishment Clause prohibits school officials 
from authorizing religious exercises at graduation ceremonies in a manner that obliges 
students to participate in such exercises.85  The defendants' agreement in Goluba to 
abandon a policy of inviting clergy or students to pray at graduation came shortly after 
the Lee decision, from which the court inferred that defendants were aware of their 
obligations under Lee. Moreover, defendants' agreement to the consent decree indicated 
that they knew the Lee decision forebade school officials themselves to include prayer at 
graduation and that they understood the decree to focus "on their own activities."[86] The 
court also noted that First Amendment jurisprudence establishes a "fine line between 
preventing school officials from endorsing religion and permitting to students freedom of 
speech and the free exercise of religion."  The court found it is unlikely that the Goluba 
defendants intended to expose themselves to a student lawsuit claiming that to prohibit 
voluntary student prayer at graduation violates free speech and free exercise of 
religion.[87]  Thus, the court concluded that "purposefully" promoting prayer rather than 
"knowingly" allowing it to occur was the better interpretation of "intentionally" as used in 
the decree: "It was the active involvement of the School District in organizing graduation 
prayer that motivated the consent decree."[88]  
   
A careful reading of Lee v. Weisman reveals that the Goluba court drew accurate 
conclusions from that case.  In reaching its holding in Lee, the Supreme Court reasoned 
that the core principle of the Establishment Clause is that government cannot coerce 
people to participate in religious exercises.[89]  The Lee Court, however, did not purport 
to interpret the Establishment Clause to require government to actively discourage 
voluntary religious exercise.  To the contrary, the Lee Court observed that "though the 
First Amendment does not allow the government to stifle prayers which aspire to these 
ends, neither does it permit the government to undertake that task for itself."[90] In 
emphasizing the limited nature of its holding, the Court also remarked that "there must be 
a place in the student's life for precepts of a morality higher even than the law we enforce 
today" and that a "relentless and all-pervasive attempt to exclude religion from every 
aspect of public life could itself become inconsistent with the Constitution."[91]  Thus, 
the Lee Court's own distinction between active government promotion of religious 
exercise and official repression of voluntary religious observance provided clear support 
for the court's conclusion in Goluba that the parties meant the word "intentionally" to 
prohibit official support for graduation prayer, not to obligate school officials to stop 
student-initiated prayer. 
   
Goluba court analyzed the substantive Establishment Clause law that gave rise to 
the lawsuit led to a proper interpretation of the ambiguous term "intentionally" for two 
reasons.  First, there was authoritative precedent -- the Lee decision -- that provided a 
context for understanding the mutual intent of the parties to the consent decree.  Second, 
the rationale for the holding of the Lee case provided a clear basis for determining what 
the parties to the consent decree understood to be their legal obligations and what were 
the limits of their obligations.  Indeed, in each of the cases prior to Microsoft I that used 
underlying substantive law to interpret ambiguous terms, the law exhibited both of these 
characteristics.[92]  
   
This analysis of the federal appellate courts' application of the Supreme Court's 
trilogy of interpretation cases establishes several key propositions.  First, if the words of a 
consent decree are unambiguous because they are capable of only one plausible meaning, 
a court is obliged to give the words that meaning without use of extrinsic evidence to 
extract a contrary meaning.  Second, when the terms of a consent decree are ambiguous, a 
rich and diverse body of "aids to construction" may be employed to determine which 
interpretation best expresses the mutual intent of the parties.  Third, although the law that 
gave rise to the lawsuit is one of the "aids to construction," when the other extrinsic 
evidence demonstrates that the parties' own mutual understanding of their obligations 
under the decree differs from their obligations under the law, the court should adopt the 
interpretation that is consistent with the parties' mutual intent, unless to do so would be in 
conflict with or a violation of the law.  This is especially true if the parties agreed to 
undertake obligations greater than required by law.  Such an agreement should be 
respected by the court.  Fourth, resort to underlying substantive law as a source of 
interpretation is clearly appropriate where there is available an authoritative declaration 
of the law and that declaration provides clear guideposts for understanding the intent of 
the parties who drafted the ambiguous terms.  If, however, the underlying law lacks one 
or both of these characteristics so that the law itself is highly ambiguous, there is a grave 
danger of using such law to interpret incorrectly a term that is ambiguous to begin with. 
   
 II. THE ISSUE OF INTERPRETATION IN MICROSOFT I AND THE 
UNDERLYING LAW OF ANTICOMPETITIVE TYING ARRANGEMENTS 
 
     The United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") sued Microsoft Corporation in 1994, 
claiming that Microsoft had sought to take advantage of its monopoly in the computer 
operating system market to engage in various anticompetitive practices.  DOJ did not 
allege that Microsoft had obtained its dominance in operating systems illegally, but 
instead alleged that Microsoft had used its monopoly power to require original equipment 
manufacturers ("OEMs")[93] who wished to use Microsoft's operating system to enter 
into licensing agreements on terms that would discourage OEMs from licensing operating 
systems offered by Microsoft's competitors. Simultaneously with filing the complaint, 
DOJ and Microsoft filed a proposed consent decree that prohibited Microsoft from 
engaging in some of the allegedly anticompetitive practices. The district court, in a 
decision that ignited a major controversy, initially refused to approve the proposed decree 
on the ground that it failed to address a wide range of alleged abuses by Microsoft.[94] 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that it was an abuse of discretion 
to reject the decree and ordered it approved.[95]  Nevertheless, controversy did not end - 
it had just begun to erupt.  
   
After the consent decree was approved, Microsoft released its new Windows 95 
operating system amid great fanfare.[96]  In its agreements licensing Windows 95 to 
OEMs, Microsoft required OEMs to accept the entire Windows 95 software package, 
including Microsoft's internet browser, Internet Explorer ("IE").  Prompted by cries from 
companies marketing competing internet browsers, chiefly Netscape, that Microsoft was 
attempting to achieve a monopoly in the browser market through its dominance of 
operating systems, DOJ filed a motion to hold Microsoft in contempt of court for 
violating the following provision in the consent decree: "Microsoft shall not enter into 
any License Agreement in which the terms of that agreement are expressly or impliedly 
conditional upon: (i) the license of any other Covered Product, Operating System 
Software product or other product (provided, however, that this provision in and of itself 
shall not be construed to prohibit Microsoft from developing integrated products;" 
(emphasis added)    
 
DOJ contended that the IE browser is a product separate from the Windows 95 
operating system and therefore Microsoft violated the consent decree by requiring OEMs 
to license an "other product," the IE browser, as a condition of licensing the Windows 95 
operating system.  In particular, DOJ argued that the effect of this agreement was to 
create an anticompetitive "tying" arrangement in that the seller, Microsoft, agreed to sell 
one product, Windows 95, only on the condition that the purchasers, OEMs, also buy an 
"other product," the IE browser.  Microsoft, on the other hand, contended that, when the 
consent decree was agreed to, Windows 95 and the IE browser were "integrated 
products" as a matter of cybernetic engineering and that, during the negotiations, DOJ 
was fully aware Microsoft intended to include the IE browser as a feature of Windows 
95.  Thus, the crucial issue was whether the IE browser was an integral part of Windows 
95 or a separate product, which in turn depended on interpretation of the term 
"integrated."[97]  
   
The district court first considered the issue raised by the motion actually before 
the court, whether to hold Microsoft in contempt.  The court found that the term 
"integrated products" was ambiguous because, while DOJ interpreted it as meaning two 
products for which there is insufficient consumer demand for the two products sold 
separately, Microsoft had offered a plausible competing interpretation of the term: a 
product that combines functions that can operate independently but, when combined, 
complement each other in a way that offers additional advantages.  Invoking a well-
settled rule that a party cannot be held in contempt of court if the order is ambiguous, the 
court held that Microsoft could not be held in contempt.[98]  
   
Having decided the issue raised by DOJ's motion, the court, apparently sua 
sponte, addressed an additional issue: whether Microsoft's interpretation of the 
ambiguous term "integrated products" was the correct one.  The court found that the 
parties' intent in prohibiting the licensing of an "other product" as a condition of licensing 
Windows 95 but permitting Microsoft to develop "integrated products" was to prohibit 
anticompetitive "tying" arrangements.  In order to interpret the term "integrated products" 
in a way the parties intended it to mean, the district court examined the substantive 
antitrust law that gave rise to DOJ's lawsuit against Microsoft.[99]  
   
In determining whether an arrangement constitutes illegal tying, the court stated 
that the initial question is whether separate products are involved.  Addressing 
Microsoft's argument that Windows 95 and the IE browser are not separate products 
because benefits are achieved when they are combined in one package, the court relied 
heavily on two leading Supreme Court cases, Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. 
Hyde [100] and Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services.[101]  These cases 
establish a rule that the proper test for determining whether two products are separate is 
whether there is sufficient consumer demand so that it is efficient for firms to produce 
them separately.  Thus, as an initial matter, the court concluded that it is irrelevant 
whether combining Windows 95 and the IE browser in one package produced functional 
benefits, because antitrust law -- which the parties intended to be the measure of whether 
two Microsoft products were "integrated" or separate -- made clear that the test is 
consumer demand, not functional benefit.[102]  
   
Applying the Jefferson Parish - Eastman Kodak test of consumer demand to 
Windows 95 and the IE browser, however, the court determined that "[w]ithout the 
benefit of further evidence in the record, an attempt to answer that question would be 
premature. Disputed issues of technological fact, as well as contract interpretation, 
abound as the record presently stands."[103] Specifically, further evidence was needed to 
address Microsoft's claim that permitting OEMs to install Windows 95 without the IE 
browser would cause other features of the operating system to become dysfunctional.  
Thus, the district court deferred ruling on the issue whether Microsoft had violated the 
consent decree, pending further discovery.[104]  Nevertheless, the district court granted a 
preliminary injunction against Microsoft's licensing of its Windows 95 operating system 
on the condition that the licensee also install Microsoft's IE browser,[105] despite the fact 
that DOJ had not moved for a preliminary injunction.  The court reasoned that, under the 
Jefferson Parish - Eastman Kodak consumer demand test, DOJ had demonstrated a 
substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its claim that there is sufficient 
consumer demand for operating systems and internet browsers sold separately to make it 
efficient for a firm to provide them separately.  If so, Windows 95 and the IE browser 
were not likely to be an "integrated" product but instead would be separate products.  
Thus, Microsoft was prohibited by the consent decree from requiring OEMs to license the 
IE browser as a condition of licensing Windows 95.[106]  
   
An examination of the Supreme Court's decision in Jefferson Parish and Eastman 
Kodak reveals that those two cases provided reasonably clear guidelines for determining, 
in the context of antitrust law, whether two products are separate or integrated.  In 
Jefferson Parish, the Court stated that "the essential characteristic of an invalid tying 
arrangement lies in the seller's exploitation of its control over the tying product to force 
the buyer into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not want at all, or 
might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms."[107]  Rejecting the 
argument that two products are not tied if they are a "functionally integrated package" 
when combined, the Court reiterated that "the answer to the question of whether one or 
two products are involved turns not on the functional relation between them, but rather on 
the character of the demand for them."[108] The Court repeated these themes in Eastman 
Kodak, in which the Court stated that, in determining whether the defendant had tied two 
separate products, "there must be sufficient consumer demand so that it is efficient for a 
firm" to offer one product separately from the other.[109]  Thus, in Microsoft I there were 
two authoritative declarations of what constitutes a separate product in the context of 
federal antitrust law.  Those declarations clearly provided a test based on consumer 
demand for separate products rather than the functional benefit of a combined 
product.[110]  Moreover, it is the test applied by the District Court in deciding to grant 
the preliminary injunction. 
   
Microsoft appealed the preliminary injunction and the Court of Appeals 
unanimously reversed for procedural error.  The appeals panel held that, by granting a 
preliminary injunction when no such motion had been made, the District Court failed to 
comply with the requirement that "no preliminary injunction shall be issued without 
notice to the adverse party."[111]  In particular, the contempt motion could not be 
deemed to provide such notice because consideration of a preliminary injunction presents 
issues -- irreparable harm, balance of harms and the public interest -- that a contempt 
motion does not.[112]  Surprisingly, however, having found a procedural error that 
rendered consideration of a preliminary injunction premature, a panel majority 
nevertheless proceeded to address one of the requirements for a preliminary injunction: 
whether DOJ was likely to prevail on the merits of the interpretation issue.  At the outset, 
then, the majority's interpretation of the disputed terms "other product" and "integrated 
products" was the product of a premature rush to judgment.[113]  
 
The majority began by observing correctly that ambiguous terms in a consent 
decree may be interpreted with the use of aids to construction that reveal the parties' 
mutual intent, and that one such aid, though not the exclusive one, is the substantive law 
from which the claims arose.[114]  It was all downhill from there.  DOJ next argued that 
one of the criteria the parties intended to be used in determining whether two products are 
separate or distinct is whether there is sufficient consumer demand for the products sold 
separately as stated in Jefferson Parish.[115]  The majority, however, reasoned that the 
parties could not have intended such a criterion to be used because it would bar Windows 
95 itself and yet the consent decree expressly permitted Windows 95.[116]  The flaw in 
this reasoning is simply that the consent decree, like any settlement, was a compromise in 
which Microsoft successfully bargained to be allowed to sell one allegedly tied product -- 
Windows 95 -- while DOJ successfully bargained to prohibit any more tied products.  
   
Having rejected DOJ's proposed formulation of underlying antitrust law as an aid 
to construction,[117] the panel majority formulated its own test that, in its view, 
reconciled antitrust law and the parties' mutual intent.  Beginning with the premise that 
"[a]ntitrust scholars have long recognized the undesirability of having courts oversee 
product design, and any dampening of technological innovation would be at cross-
purposes with antitrust law,"[118] the majority relied heavily on a leading antitrust law 
treatise for the proposition that the consent decree should be interpreted to permit "any 
genuine technological innovation."[119]  Such an innovation was defined by the court as 
having two elements: the two products must be combined in a way that a purchaser could 
not if he bought them separately ("unity") and the combined products must produce 
benefit beyond what a purchaser could achieve if he bought them separately 
("value").[120]  This test supposedly was consistent with antitrust tying law because, 
although Jefferson Parish and Eastman Kodak ruled that products are to be deemed 
separate if there exists sufficient consumer demand for the products sold separately to 
allow firms to produce them efficiently, such a test should not apply to high-tech 
products such as software.[121]  This latter theme was repeated in a rebuttal of the 
dissenting opinion, which had argued that the ambiguous terms "other product" and 
"integrated products" should be interpreted consistently with the Jefferson Parish - 
Eastman Kodak test of independent consumer demand.[122]  The majority responded that 
such a test for high-tech products "is not feasible in any predictable or useful way.  
Courts are ill-equipped to evaluate the benefits of high-tech product design."[123]  In 
essence, then, despite its acknowledgment that a proper aid to construing the intent of 
parties who agreed to ambiguous terms is the substantive law that gave rise to the claims, 
the majority in Microsoft I contended that the law in existence at the time the agreement 
was negotiated should not apply to high-tech products.  Subsumed within this analysis is 
a radical effort to change existing law by creating an exception to it, using interpretation 
of a negotiated settlement as the vehicle.[124]  
 
Microsoft I truly represents making law in the shadow of a negotiated settlement, 
but unfortunately it is a misguided adventure.  To begin with, even assuming it is 
appropriate to create an exception to existing substantive law through interpretation of a 
consent decree,[125] the author of the very section of the antitrust law treatise that the 
majority relied upon publicly criticized the opinion.  He stated that the majority had 
misinterpreted the test he had proposed in the treatise.  He explained that his proposed 
test is that "plaintiffs must show that the products could feasibly be separated and that 
some buyers would want to purchase them in their separated form;" if such a finding is 
made, defendants can rebut it in several ways, one of which is by showing "that the items 
operate better when combined by the seller than when bought separately and combined 
by the buyer."[126]  The Microsoft I majority went astray, in his view, because "[w]hat 
the court forgot was the threshold rule to judge what constitutes one product: the plaintiff 
must first show that some buyers would actually want the items in their separated form".  
Had the court applied this test for determining whether two products are separate, he 
concluded, it should have found that Windows 95 and the IE browser are indeed separate 
products within the meaning of the consent decree, because "surely, there are buyers who 
would want to buy Windows 95 separately from Internet Explorer."[127]  Thus, the 
majority in Microsoft I failed to comprehend the very exception it adopted, thereby 
misusing it. 
   
The most objectionable part of the Microsoft I decision, however, is its 
assumption that it is appropriate to use a proposed change in substantive law as an aid to 
construction of a consent decree.  A controversy has been brewing for some years over 
whether existing antitrust tying law will unduly hamper innovation in the design of high-
tech products such as computer software.  Some commentators have argued that antitrust 
tying law should be modified to permit new product combinations that genuinely improve 
product performance even if there is sufficient consumer demand for the products sold 
separately.  Some proponents of this view have further argued that, in applying such a 
high-tech exception, judges should not undertake an independent inquiry into whether an 
innovative combination actually improves performance because they are not competent to 
do so.  In this view, judges should only determine whether the claimed improvements are 
plausible.[128]  The Microsoft I court leaped into this controversy by attempting to carve 
out a "high-tech" exception from existing legal standards set forth by the Supreme Court.  
The panel majority acknowledged that the Court had reiterated in Eastman Kodak that 
independent consumer demand is the test for whether two products are separate, but 
contended that "we doubt that it would have subjected a self-repairing copier to the same 
analysis."[129] There is not one word in the Eastman Kodak opinion, however, that 
implies the Court would create a "high-tech" exception.[130] Moreover, since consumer 
demand is the established test, not whether a newly designed product functions better 
than previous ones, it is difficult to understand why analysis of consumer demand for 
high-tech products is so much more elusive than demand for other products as to place it 
beyond the comprehension of judges.  
   
This is not to say that lower-level courts should never call for change in the law.  
Courts often sound such calls, and properly so, in cases which have been fully litigated 
and the court has rendered an adjudication on what the law is, or ought to be.[131]  It is a 
different matter, however, when a court's task is to interpret ambiguous terms in a 
consent decree in accordance with the parties' mutual intent.  The parties negotiate the 
terms in the context of what they understand their obligations to be under existing law.  
The yet-to-be declared law of the future by its very nature cannot be part of the parties' 
calculations, because they cannot know what the law will be.  Thus, it is inappropriate to 
use interpretation of ambiguous terms in a consent decree as a vehicle for changing 
substantive law, because such change is irrelevant to determining what the parties 
intended such terms to mean when they negotiated their settlement.  
   
Microsoft I is now history.  DOJ did not petition the Supreme Court for a writ of 
certiorari.  Instead, DOJ filed a new and much broader suit against Microsoft, accusing 
the software giant of engaging in a widespread pattern of anticompetitive business 
practices and abuses, of which tying its internet browser to its operating system is only 
one.[132]  The trial of this case dragged on for many weeks, consuming enormous 
financial and judicial resources and diverting the energies of high-tech corporate 
executives from their businesses.  This entire spectacle might have been avoided if the 
appeals court in Microsoft I either had not rushed to judgment or had simply applied 
existing antitrust law.  It was the majority's interpretation of the consent decree, allowing 
Microsoft to require OEMs to license the IE browser as a condition of licensing Windows 
95, that prompted DOJ, at least in part, to file the broader lawsuit.  At least that case will 
end one day.  The more lasting potential damage of the Microsoft I decision, however, is 
the improper way in which it used underlying substantive law as a method of interpreting 
ambiguous terms in a consent decree.  The damage must be confined to that one case.  
 
 III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE USE OF UNDERLYING 
SUBSTANTIVE LAW AS AN AID TO CONSTRUING CONSENT DECREES: 
THE PROPER LIMITS OF MAKING LAW IN THE SHADOW OF 
NEGOTIATIONS 
 
     It is now established and proper that one of the aids to construing ambiguous terms in 
a consent decree is the law that gave rise to the claims in the case.[133]  A consent decree 
is treated as a contract when an issue of interpretation arises, because the proper role of 
the court is simply to determine what the parties jointly intended the terms to mean when 
they negotiated the settlement. The policy that requires the parties' mutual intent to be the 
touchstone of interpretation is that settlement is strongly encouraged as a means of 
reducing the costs associated with full-scale adjudication.  It permits the parties, through 
their own voluntary efforts, to achieve a more finely crafted solution to the practical 
problems that gave rise to their dispute than a judge, less familiar with the problems, 
could arrive at through adjudication.  Requiring judges to interpret terms by determining 
what the parties most likely intended them to mean provides a strong incentive to settle 
cases.  It promotes the confidence of the parties to a settlement that it will not impose 
significantly greater or lesser obligations than they believed they were agreeing to.  
Conversely, such confidence would be severely shaken and major disincentives to settle 
would be created if some other standard -- such as the judge's personal opinion that 
established law is wrong and should be changed -- were the basis of interpretation.  An 
important part of the context in which parties engage in negotiations to settle a lawsuit is 
their understanding of what their obligations under the law would likely be if the case 
were resolved through adjudication.  It is in this sense that negotiations occur "in the 
shadow of the law."[134]  Thus, when agreed terms are susceptible of more than one 
plausible interpretation, an understanding of the parties' legal obligations can shed 
considerable light on what they believed they were agreeing to.[135]  
   
The very policy of encouraging settlement by respecting the parties' intent, 
however, also demonstrates that there must be limits on the use of underlying law to 
interpret ambiguous settlement terms.  Microsoft I is an exemplar of what these limits 
should be.  First, if the proceedings in the case have not been sufficiently thorough to 
afford an opportunity for the kind of mature deliberation required for an accurate 
determination of what the law is or should be, a court should not use the law as an aid to 
construing the parties' intent.  The risk of error caused by a rush to judgment is too great.  
If the parties' intent is to be divined from an ill-considered, hasty evaluation of the law, 
they would have a strong incentive to take their chances with adjudication.  In Microsoft 
I, for example, the Court of Appeals first ruled that the district court acted prematurely in 
addressing the issue of a preliminary injunction and then did the same thing itself by 
ruling that whether a preliminary injunction should be issued on remand must be decided 
by its own interpretation of the consent decree.  Indeed, the Microsoft I decision bears 
one of the hallmarks of a rush to judgment: reliance on authority that contradicts rather 
than supports the legal proposition being asserted.[136]  
 
Second, if the underlying law does not provide sufficiently clear guidelines for 
determining what the parties intended the words to mean, the law should not be used as 
an aid to construction because it cannot be an accurate measure of the parties' intent.  
Unclear law can only provide an unclear picture of the parties' intent.  Use of such law as 
a basis for interpretation would discourage settlement because the parties' obligations 
would be unclear to the extent the court relies upon such law to resolve disputes of 
interpretation.  Microsoft I again provides the negative example.  Assume for the moment 
that antitrust law is unclear as to when two products are considered "separate" when the 
producer has in fact combined them into what appears to be a single product.[137]  Such 
an assumption precludes a finding that DOJ and Microsoft negotiated the terms "other 
product" and "integrated products" with the thought that they were incorporating antitrust 
tying law into their agreement, for there was no clear law on that subject.  
 
Finally, if the underlying law is reasonably clear, a court should not change the 
law by interpreting ambiguous terms in light of what the court thinks the law should be.  
Not only does such a process of law-making lack the mature deliberation that it is a 
feature of traditional adjudication through trial and appeal, but also it cannot provide an 
accurate picture of the parties' intent at the time of settlement.  To the extent the parties 
have the law in mind when they draft a settlement, it is almost certainly the law in 
existence at that time, not some law that might develop in the future.  Using what a judge 
thinks the law ought to be rather than what the law was at the time of settlement will 
create a disincentive to settle because it robs a settlement of the very stability and 
predictability of obligation that the parties seek.  
   
Herein lies the most critical disincentive to settle threatened by the way in which 
the consent decree was interpreted in Microsoft I. The issue of interpretation in the case 
was whether the Windows 95 operating system and the IE browser, once combined by 
Microsoft, became an "integrated" product or remained separate products such that 
requiring OEMs to license the browser in order to license the operating system was 
prohibited by the consent decree.  The Jefferson Parish and Eastman Kodak decisions 
establish that products are deemed separate in antitrust law when there is sufficient 
consumer demand for the products sold separately to make it efficient for firms to 
produce them separately.  Windows 95 and the IE browser would be deemed separate 
under this test because such demand almost certainly existed.[138]  The Court of Appeals 
could avoid this result only by changing the law and creating an exception for "high-tech" 
products, in which combining previously separate products into one package creates an 
integrated package if the combination creates benefits that a purchaser could not achieve 
by buying them separately and combining them, without regard to consumer demand for 
the separate products.  This exception was not part of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence 
at the time DOJ and Microsoft negotiated the consent decree, so it cannot be an accurate 
gauge of their mutually intended meaning of the words "other product" and "integrated 
products."  
   
The D.C. Circuit's method of interpretation in Microsoft I could adversely affect 
negotiations to settle lawsuits by undermining the clarity of obligation settlement is 
designed to achieve.  In government antitrust cases, for example, it raises the specter for 
DOJ that judges will narrow the scope of prohibited business activities agreed to by the 
parties by narrowing the scope of antitrust law and using the narrowed scope to measure 
the parties' antecedent intent.  For a defendant business, it raises the converse specter that 
a judge will broaden the activities it may not engage in beyond what it thought it had 
agreed to, simply by broadening the scope of antitrust law and using it to expand the 
parties' intended meaning of the prohibitions.  This interpretive method undermines the 
certainty and stability that are two of the chief values of settlement.  Moreover, it makes 
the relative certainty of obligation produced by adjudication after trial and appeal much 
more attractive.[139]  
   
Conclusion 
 
Consent decrees serve the important policies of preserving scarce judicial 
resources, reducing the costs of full-scale litigation, and promoting practical solutions to 
complex structural problems.  When disputes arise over the meaning of particular terms 
in consent decrees, courts should employ methods of interpretation that preserve litigants' 
incentives to settle.  If disputed terms are unambiguous in that they are capable of only 
one plausible meaning the judge should adopt that meaning without resort to extrinsic 
evidence to divine the parties' intent.  If the terms are ambiguous, aids to construction 
should be evaluated in order to determine what the parties most likely intended the words 
to mean.  Such aids include the parties' claims and defenses, the course of negotiations, 
parties' statements made at the time of approval by the court, the parties' conduct in 
implementing the settlement, and the underlying law that gave rise to the lawsuit.  When 
the latter aid is used, if evidence of the parties' own understanding of the terms differs 
from the underlying law, the parties' own understanding should prevail because their 
intent is the touchstone of interpretation.  If there is no such difference and the underlying 
law becomes the basis for interpretation, judges should take care that their evaluation is 
the product of mature deliberation and that the law provides reasonably clear guidelines 
by which the parties' intent may be discerned.  Finally, if the law is reasonably clear, 
judges should follow it and not attempt to change the law in measuring the parties' 
antecedent intent. These methods of interpretation will preserve the incentives to settle by 
making a consent decree a reasonably stable and certain statement of obligations.  
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In a similar vein, another commentator "assumes that the Court of Appeals correctly 
interpreted the consent decree even though the Court of Appeals failed to follow antitrust 
law."  See supra note 9, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. at 4.  It is accurate to say the majority 
failed to follow established antitrust law to follow established antitrust law embodied in 
the consumer demand test and instead adopted a radically different "plausible benefit" 
test.  If that is so, however, then the assumption that the majority correctly interpreted the 
terms "other product" and "integrated products " is wrong, because those terms have 
specialized meanings in antitrust law which are proper aids to construction.  Thus, if 
Windows 95 and the IE browser are separate products under the consumer demand test, 
they are separate within the meaning of the consent decree. 
 
[FN136] See supra, text accompanying notes 123-125. 
 
[FN137] This assumption could be based, for example, upon a split of authority over 
whether consumer demand or functional benefit is the appropriate test for determining 
whether two "high-tech" items are a single product. 
 
[FN138] See supra, note 9, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. at 24 (asserting that, under the 
consumer demand test, there is "little doubt that Internet Explorer and Windows 95 are 
distinct products under antitrust law of bundling"). 
 
[FN139] In Microsoft II, for example, District Judge Jackson will issue findings of fact 
prior to entering conclusions of law.  If the findings of fact indicate Judge Jackson is 
likely to rule that Microsoft has violated the Sherman Act, there will be intense pressure 
to settle the case.  If, however, the terms they agree upon are subject to the whims of an 
appellate court that might seize upon a dispute over ambiguous terms as an opportunity to 
change established law, they might find it preferable to await a final judgment on the 
merits and appeal adverse rulings. 
 
This is not to suggest that all incentives to settle will be undermined.  In antitrust cases in 
particular, a notable settlement benefit to defendants is avoidance of the rule that a 
judgment against the defendant in a government antitrust action is prima facie evidence 
against the defendant in subsequent private antitrust suits for treble damages.  See Note, 
Ruing Rufo: Ramifications of the Lenient Standard for Modifying Antitrust Consent 
Decrees and an Alternative, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 130, 135 (1996).  Thus, Microsoft 
might still decide to settle despite uncertainty of interpretation in order to avoid increased 
risk of liability for treble damages to its competitors. 
 
  
    
       
